This paper provides an evaluation of the effects of privatisation on the efficiency of firms in the case of large Spanish State-Owned Enterprises that had been privatised from 1990 onward. The firms' efficiency is approached here by financialperformance indicators, through acknowledging, on the one hand, their shortcomings and, on the other, the advantage of their direct comprehensibility. Unlike other research work that compares pre-post privatisation performance, we 1) make use here of usual economic-performance indicators, though taking into account their hierarchical relationship; 2) take as privatisation moment the point at which control over the firm actually passes from the government to private investors; and 3) work on companies' base data, and exclude all extraordinary and non-operating financial flows.
Introduction
With the present research we aim to evaluate what the effect has been of privatisation on the firms' efficiency, analysing six cases of large Spanish State Owned Enterprises (SOE) that were privatised. We approach the firms' efficiency in terms of economic performance indicators. The economic literature on privatisation, specially those works that are based on the property rights theory, tend to refer to improvements in financial results when speaking about the expected consequences of privatising a SOE; and that on the grounds that firms' efficiency will increase by passing under private investors' control. It can be argued that financial results indicators are not the best ones for assessing the efficiency degree of an enterprise, though they do have the advantage of their unambiguous, broadly well known meaning. Certainly, even if we rule out the use of the simple profits (or losses)
figures and use relative values like the rate of return on capital employed (profitability) or the rate of return on sales (rate of margin), these are indicators whose values do depend on the level of firm's efficiency but also on other variables; mainly: output prices, input prices, and company decisions (options) on investment in fixed assets vs. renting those fixed assets, as well as decisions on the product mix.
Therefore, a change in, for instance, the rate of profitability can not be taken as the reflection of a parallel change in firm's efficiency, but as the sum of a set of consequences, the change in efficiency being just one of them. Of course, the firm's efficiency is understood in this context in its standard meaning: a given relationship between the quantity of output(s) and the quantity of inputs; that is, as equivalent to the idea of the firms' productivity. However, to evaluate an enterprise's efficiency by calculating productivity indexes for a set of periods (years), requires -besides having data on quantities of every output and of every input, for each year-relying on assumptions, as is well known. Thus, when the option is to calculate properly firm's productivity for a set of years, that leads us to the use of overall productivity indexes (total factor productivity, TFP); and these require some assumptions on how to homogenise, on the one hand, the quantities of the different firm's outputs, and, on the other hand, the quantities of the various firm's inputs, in order to determine TFP indexes for each year of the study period; (see, for instance, Bishop and Thomson, 1992; Haskel and Szymanski, 1993; Parker and Martin, 1995; Boussofiante, Martin and Parker, 1997; Franuelli and Erbetta, 2000, Estache, González and Trujillo, 2002) .
On the other hand, when the methodological option is to use a partial productivity index (usually one referring to some measure of the input 'labour') we face the problem that partial productivity indexes do not have a conclusive meaning regarding the evaluation of the firm's efficiency. Thus, taking the most used partial productivity index, the labour productivity index, the change in its value from one year to another can not actually be taken as an indicator of how the efficiency of the firm has changed, because the value of that index come from comparing the total output with only one of the inputs: units of labour; therefore, an increase in such index does not necessarily mean that the firms' efficiency have increased. So, for instance, the decades-long time-trend towards mechanisation and automating of production processes implies, by itself, the (relative) reduction of workforce in a firm; and, therefore, a formal -and substantial-increase in the labour productivity index, however we define it. Yet, from these increases we cannot deduct that the productivity of the firm as such has actually increased (or not in the same proportion) since the consumption of capital and other inputs will have considerably increased.
These difficulties related to productivity measures most likely explain the relative preference given to financial results indicators in most research works on postprivatisation comparative efficiency/economic-performance of firms. Thus : Parker and Hartley, 1992; Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh, 1994; Martin and Parker, 1997; d'Souza and Megginson, 1999; Bourbakri and Cosset, 1998; La Porta and López de Silanes, 1999; Megginson and Netter, 2000; Laurin and Bozec, 2001; Wei, 2003; Florio, 2003; Comstock, Kish and Vasconcellos, 2003; Omram, 2004; Reeves and Palcic, 2004; Gupta, 2005. Looking at the findings from the above studies we can see that their conclusions do not always point in the same direction. Some of them conclude that economic performance -specially when measured by firm's profitability-improved after privatisation (Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh, 1994; Bourbakri and Cosset, 1998; d'Souza and Megginson, 1999; Laurin and Bozec, 2001; Gupta, 2005) ; But other works find no remarkable changes in economic performance comparing previous to post-privatisation periods (Parker and Hartley, 1992; Martin and Parker, 1997; Wei, 2003; Florio, 2003; Omram, 2004: Reeves and Palcic, 2004) . Therefore, more empirical evidence on the matter of post-privatisation comparative efficiency would be welcome.
Following this line, in the present study we have chosen the above approach of using economic performance indicators for measuring the effects of privatisation in the case of large Spanish firms.
The analysed enterprises
Focusing on the larger Spanish SOE that were privatised from 1990 onward, we have taken for our analysis the ones that fitted the following conditions: 1) company data for at least four years after privatisation are available; this condition also implies that the company has a continuity as such after privatisation; 2) firm's activities mix and market regulation in the previous and post-privatisation periods are comparable. As a consequence, we exclude from the analysis some large SOE: Iberia (airlines) and 14.885 1997
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Methodological approach
Here we approach the economic performance of privatised companies by using financial results rates. Our base values are annual profits, revenues, and investment, but cleaning the usual raw accounting data taking out non operating and extraordinary expenses and incomes. To do this, we work on primary data from each firm, so as to determine ordinary operating profits (P"), ordinary operating revenues relationship has a useful meaning for efficiency analysis. Thus, for instance, a change in enterprise policy towards leasing instead of buying fixed assets (equipment, machinery, buildings, etc.) will increase the rate of revenue per unit of capital invested (R/K), and, consequently -all the rest the same-it will increase the profitability index, p; but we could not say in that case that the enterprise's efficiency has improved since no change in the output/input relationships have occurred.
Furthermore, variable m as it has been defined above is in fact formally related to output/input relationships:
(where i f = quantity of input or factor f; c f = unit cost of f; o g = quantity of output or goods g; p g = sale price of output g) .
Therefore, it can be said that variable m is a closer indicator to the standard concept of an enterprise's efficiency (productivity) than variable p is. And we take this meaning-ranking of variables into account when applying both indicators to each privatised firm; especially where changes showed by the two indicators -comparing previous to post-privatisation period data-point out to a different conclusion.
These two measures are calculated here -for each enterprise (e)-for a set of years (y) -four, o more if data are available-before privatisation and also four or more years after privatisation. As usual, the privatisation year is not taken here as part of either one or the other period. Then we calculate for each firm the average for each indicator, for the respective previous and post-privatisation periods, and determine the difference between both means -after vs. before-for each indicator. And finallyafter evaluating the statistical robustness of the resulting differences between meanswe go on to draw conclusions on what appear to be the changes in economic performance of each firm brought about by its privatisation.
As far as the moment of privatisation is concerned, we take -different from the standard option-the one when the firm actually passes into private control. That means not necessarily taking the moment when 50%-plus (or a lower but significant percentage) of firm's shares passes to private investor ownership, but the moment when power upon the firm (i.e., control) actually goes outside the government.
The prediction that privatisation will likely bring an improvement in economic performance is based -according property rights theory-on the argument that control over the firm's manager and its results will change from government to a private principal, which -it is assumed-will control the firm's manager in a more effective way. Notwithstanding, most of the research works referred to before comparing prepost privatisation economic performance take a purely quantitative approach to place the year of privatisation: when a significant percentage of the shares pass to private investors. This approach creates a lack of consistency, especially in the case of SOE that have been privatised in stages, usually by means of POs in the stock market;
which are precisely the dominant case analysed in the aforementioned available studies on post-privatisation's comparative performance. However, as it well known in those partial POs cases the private ownership of the shares tend to become diluted on the stock market, which means that quite a lot less than 50% of public ownership (even percentages as low as 25% -10%) may be enough to keep control of the firm in State hands.
It has been on the basis of that analysis that we have chosen to take as the privatisation 'moment' for each firm as the one (the year) that the firm actually passed into private control. This option, together with that of using ordinary operating rates of return as indicators, has led us towards an in-depth case study, approach. On the other hand, large companies -be they private or public-often own subsidiaries engaged in different economic activities; and in those cases the published annual accounts of the company are not always clear whether they refer to the group (consolidated financial statements) or to the parent company's basic activity; (we have found that even companies' annual reports are not always consistent over time in that sense). Not to account for all those issues implies ignoring possible inconsistencies in data among different years, which may result in false conclusions. The aim of avoiding this problem have reinforced our option of using primary data to enable an in-deep analysis for each firm.
Empirical results
The Table   2 ): financial results passed from persistent losses (years 1991-93) , to steady profits the years immediately prior to privatisation . It merits pointing out that the firm had in fact been restructured years ago, at a considerable cost for the State budget; firstly in 1984 and again in 1989, eight years before privatisation. This restructuring also implied a substantial reduction in the workforce, closing several mills, as well as huge new investments for modernising the others. Financial results then change dramatically from being in the red to substantial profits four years before privatisation. Thus, it could be one of the cases where the announcement of privatisation seems to bring together a change in control and management practices which bring in a clear improvement in economic performance; to such a point that performance was actually slightly lower in the years after privatisation. Other cases of improvement in SOE economic performance within the years immediately before the privatisation (announcement period) have been reported (Green and Vogelsang, 1994; Martin and Parker, 1997; Reeves and Palcic, 2004) ; and precisely one of this cases refers to a steel company too: British Steel (Aylen, 1994; Beauman, 1996) . An explanation suggested for these findings has been that from the announcement onward, annual targets for financial results are (more) tightly fixed by the Government on the firms' managers as the main objective, if not the only one. Our results in the case of the Spanish steel enterprise -along with descriptions of organisational changes, drawn from company annual reports-would lend support to that hypothesis.
In the case of the old monopoly on tobacco & stamps retail, Tabacalera, economic performance indicators show a dramatic improvement after privatisation: rate of margin was 11.6 percentage points higher on average; and profitability rate 9.2 percentage points. In fact Tabacalera exhibited a record of steady profits from its start as a mixed company in 1946 (54.4 % of state ownership). It is the only SOE analysed here that had enjoyed a legal monopoly. Its monopoly on tobacco, and regulation on its prices, were removed just one year before its privatisation; though the company continued enjoying a de-facto monopoly position as far as the domestic market was concerned. And regarding stamp retail, its legal monopoly remained even after privatisation; nevertheless, at the time of its privatisation Tabacalera created a new company, Logista, and transferred the stamps retail activity to it. Therefore, Tabacalera's economic performance data for the post-privatisation period refers only to tobacco activity. Assuming that stamp distribution very likely had a rather low ratio of margin to price as compared to tobacco 1 , we could expect that the afterprivatisation Tabacalera -thereafter centred on the tobacco business-would show a higher rate of margin than before privatisation. Therefore, this change in the activity mix simultaneous with privatisation means that the observed increases in economic performance indicators cannot be clearly attributed to firm's privatisation.
The analysis of Endesa, the largest Spanish electricity company, shows that its economic performance actually worsened after privatisation. Ordinary operating rate of margin -coming from quite high values during the pre-privatisation period-fell 9.4 percentage points on average (with a high degree of confidence, according to statistics test). No relevant changes either in market regulation or domestic market share from previous to after privatisation periods took place. Thus, we infer that explanatory causes for the observed dramatic downward trend in economic efficiency indicators after privatisation do not relate to market variables but to the firm's own variables. Among these, it merits pointing out that Endesa's strategy at the time was of taking positions in foreign electricity companies; mainly in Latin America; a policy that was enhanced after privatisation.
Since -different from the other two enterprises referred to above-there was an Initial
Public Offering on the stock market (IPO) of Endesa's shares ten years before its privatisation, we have also compared economic performance before and after this IPO. The current underlying assumption for that is that an IPO for a SOE will mean that the company's annual profits will become more clearly a target (a must) for the firm's managers, because some private investors will have a seat for the first time at the company's board. According to that it could be expected that Endesa's economic performance would improve as a result of becoming a 'partially private' firm. And
this is just what we observe: the ordinary operating rate of margin increased 4.6 percentage points as a mean during the three years after the IPO as compared with the previous period. However, stretching the pre-privatisation period taken in table 1 to encompass also these years (that is, all the data-available years as SOE, 12), the conclusion on the worsening of economic performance after privatisation remains.
Notwithstanding, we get different, opposite, conclusions from the analysis of the privatisation of the oil company, Repsol; one of the few relevant Spanish multinationals. Economic performance indicators -always on the positive side since the creation of Repsol as a SOE-improved significantly after privatisation: +3.2 percentage points on average in the rate of margin. Nevertheless, when years before an IPO had also been undertaken, and as a consequence more than 30% of the shares passed to private investors' hands, economic performance measured with our two indicators experienced a negative change.
In the case of the electricity carrier, REE, our analysis actually shows a lower economic performance after privatisation. REE runs -since its was created as SOEthe national high voltage grid, in monopoly conditions (mainly because of natural monopoly features). Due to that, when it was privatised it continued to be a (regulated) monopoly, as it is at present (2006). However, economic performance indicators are lower, on average, in the post-privatisation period: Ordinary Operating rate of margin, albeit remaining quite high, decreases 8.6 percentage points 2 ; though ordinary operating profitability rate is on average almost the same: it shows a slight decrease of 0.5 points. This finding would be consistent with the proposition that when a public monopoly is privatised and, for whatever the reason, the monopoly situation remains, we are not likely to see improvements in efficiency. In our case (REE) there is even a decrease in economic indicators observed.
Finally, for the case of Telefonica, the largest of the privatised firms we analyse here, we find contradictory results: economic performance measured by ordinary operating rate of profitability increased after privatisation by two percentage points, though measured by the rate of margin decreased slightly: half a point. It happens, though, that both changes (differences between average values) do not have acceptable levels of confidence according to statistics test. The empirical results rather point out as the most confident conclusion that no significant changes in efficiency were actually produced after privatisation. However, it must be taken into account that the monopoly position in cable telecommunications that Telefonica enjoyed came to an end just around the same time it was privatised. The cable market was liberalised in 1996 though the second cable operator (Retevision) started to operate in 1997, the same year as the privatisation of Telefonica. Assuming that competition could then have pushed prices somewhat downward, we may infer that the differences in performance indicators we find might in fact show a mix of changes in efficiency and the effect of market competition. But no data are available so far to try to properly separate both causes.
Conclusions
Summarising the partial results from the six case studies, we see that for two of them Summing up, as an overall conclusion from the analysed cases, it could not be said that privatisation brought systematic improvements in economic efficiency of the firms but, on the contrary, that rather a mix of non-significant and negative changes dominates in the case of large Spanish privatisation transactions.
That conclusion, which could be seen as a surprising outcome, certainly does not lend proper support to the usual prediction (grounded on the property rights theory)
that the economic performance of a SOE will tend to improve if they are privatised.
Since this prediction stems from the assumption that either private control on managers will be more effective than previous State control or private owners will substitute the managers in charge of the SOE by better ones, we could conclude that perhaps these assumptions should be reviewed by the supporters of property rights theory.
The empirical results of this paper point towards the convenience of broadening the scope of the available empirical research on the topic; mainly by including more cases of privatised firms. Specially those cases where SOE were sold not through (sd) = standard deviation; (se)= standard error (SDOM) Source: Self elaborated, from primary data from: Annual Reports of the firm, (sd) = standard deviation; (se)= standard error (SDOM) Source: Elaborated by authors using primary data from Annual Reports of the firm, 1,478 (sd) = standard deviation; (se)= standard error (SDOM) Source: Elaborated by authors using primary data from Annual Reports of the firm.
